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Indonesia as a growing maritime power: possible implications for Australia 
Geoffrey Till 
There are two reasons why Australia should be interested in the new but now much-discussed 
maritime aspirations of Indonesia and the trials and tribulations Indonesia faces in turning those 
aspirations into reality. The first and most obvious is that the maritime performance of its nearest 
and potentially most powerful neighbour are bound to play an important role in shaping the context 
in which Australia itself defines its own maritime interests  and acts to defend them. The emergence 
of a new and significant maritime power in Australia’s immediate strategic vicinity is bound to be a 
matter of major interest.  
The second reason is perhaps a little less obvious, and is the focus of this paper. Indonesia and 
Australia are alike in being Indo-Pacific countries that are growing their maritime and naval forces. 
All around the region - from China to Brunei - naval modernisation is proceeding apace, such that 
for the first time in 400 years, Asian naval spending exceeds that of Western Europe.1 In sharp 
distinction to their European counterparts, Asian navies are making use of expanding budgets to 
develop new operational aspirations, to go further afield and to perform increasingly ambitious 
tasks. Because some of these tasks imply competition rather than cooperation between navies, there 
are even probably exaggerated fears of a naval arms race developing in the region with 
unforeseeable but portentous implications for regional stability.2 
Given the current level of dispute in the South and East China seas, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
the focus of most current discussion should be on the causes, prospects and possible consequences 
of growing maritime power and naval expansion in the region, rather than on the problems that 
countries face in turning such plans into reality. But in fact there are a great many hurdles and 
challenges to be overcome before this can be done. Although every country is unique in its geo-
strategic setting, cultural expectation, economic requirements and resources, they all face similar 
challenges. Accordingly, Indonesia’s experience in growing its maritime power will not be of 
interest to Australia solely in terms of the possible product, but also as a particular illustration of the 
process of becoming a maritime power. An exercise in contrast and comparison between different 
countries in how they set about a common task like building a bigger navy may well provide a 
better understanding of the problems that each faces in doing so. 
But, first, a short excursion into definitions seems necessary. This paper draws a sharp distinction 
between ‘being maritime’ and ‘being a maritime power’. Being maritime - or not - is often a matter 
of circumstance, something over which a country has little or no control. It means simply having 
maritime interests that derive from the international context in which countries find themselves, 
whether they like it or not. These maritime interests may derive from simple geography and the 
economic imperatives it sets. They may be determined by experience, habits of thought, culture and 
practice that are the consequence of long years of responding to these maritime circumstances. 
Some of these interests bear a distinct similarity to Mahan’s famous conditions for sea power.3 But 
the point is that they are interests only. They do not imply the capability to defend or develop them. 
Being a maritime power, on the other hand, means having just such a capability to some extent or 
other. Most, perhaps all, countries will naturally want to become maritime powers in this sense, 
because it means being able to turn having maritime interests into an advantage and to greater 
control over one’s destiny. It requires an enhanced willingness and capacity to respond actively to 
one’s circumstances. But Indonesia’s recent and current experience shows that growing maritime 
power in this way is not easy. That experience has lessons to teach. 
Setting the Maritime Agenda 
Indonesia’s long-term geo-strategic circumstances, most obviously its geographic position and 
conformation, produces the country’s maritime interests. Firstly, it is an archipelago of 18,000 
islands and five million km2 of water. Even for Indonesia to be a country requires the capacity to 
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control events in the waters that divide its very scattered bits of real estate. Those islands are very 
diverse too. Because of their physical nature, and their varying soil fertility, some of the islands 
depend on the resources of the sea, but others do not. Distance from the main manufacturing centres 
makes a huge difference too. A bag of cement costs ten times in Papua what it does in Java; this has 
considerable consequences for economic development. For all these reasons, Indonesia’s leaders 
have long developed an ‘archipelagic outlook’ [Wawasan Nusantara], which often means an acute 
sensitivity to the presence of foreign ships in ‘Indonesian waters’, however defined.4 Simply by 
being there, they may threaten Indonesia’s nationhood. For all the Indonesian navy’s aspirations to 
build on its experience off the Lebanon and to travel afar, necessarily, its sea focus is necessarily 
very local - at least for the time being. 
There is, however, little reason to suppose that things will necessarily stay that way. Now, senior 
figures are talking of Indonesia building a ‘world class navy’. Instead, there are many reasons to 
think that a successful Indonesian navy will aspire to transition through brown, green and blue 
waters, to shift from the near seas to the far seas just as the Chinese navy appears to be doing.5 It is 
as though this were an iron law of naval development, other things being equal. 
This can be reinforced by the appeal to history, especially harking back to the old Srivijaya and 
Majapahit empires  five and six hundred years ago, when local rulers developed powerful fleets to 
conquer others all the way up southern Thailand and the Philippines and to control local seas. 
Sceptics though argue that these were just transient regional empires; in no real sense were they 
‘Indonesian’. Indeed most Indonesians have probably never heard of them.  
Indonesia is also the link between two oceans: the Indian and the Pacific. A third of the world’s 
shipping and 2500 liquefied natural gas carriers pass through its waters every year. Indonesia is, 
whether it likes or not, a global maritime axis or fulcrum. Two points arise. First, the country’s 
current leaders complain that passing traffic does just that - it passes through, without providing 
much in the way of benefit to Indonesia. Only if this traffic provides added value to the Indonesian 
economy, they say, will the country develop its potential and improve life for its inhabitants. 
Second, the fact that this is a sea route of global significance means that outsiders are hugely 
interested in it.  
The current expression of that external interest is how should Indonesia respond to China's 
controversial concept of the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ - which aims to link China to the 
outer world through the Indian Ocean? Should it be welcomed as a source of financial investment in 
Indonesia’s decrepit port infrastructure or feared as a potential source of strategic domination? 
Given the wariness of India, the United States and other countries to China’s maritime vision, how 
should Indonesia react? 
The matter is complicated by the third of Indonesia’s maritime interests - its jurisdictional holdings 
in local seas and not least in the South China Sea. Jurisdiction over these areas, and of the oil, gas 
and fish they contain, remains contentious. Indonesia is in dispute with several of its neighbours. 
This includes China whose infamous ‘9-dash line’ overlaps the Indonesian exclusive economic zone 
in the Natuna island area where some of its most critical gas resources are to be found. Indonesia 
has long considered itself not to be a claimant to the South China Sea and hence not directly 
involved in the increasingly rancorous dispute in the area. But Indonesians are beginning to accept 
that in fact it is, as China increasingly asserts its interests in the region.6 So, how is this to be 
managed alongside the challenge of the Maritime Silk Road? 
For Jakarta this issue has to be set alongside much broader strategic currents in the Asia-Pacific 
region such as the developing relationship between China and the United States and between north 
and southeast Asia - and indeed the slow development of an ASEAN political and economic 
community. As a function of the sheer size of its population and its enormous economic potential, 
Indonesia has long thought of itself a leading member of the non-aligned world and a pacesetter for 
ASEAN. Given the fact that in such a maritime area as the Asia-Pacific region all of these 
developments have significant maritime consequences; they too help set Indonesia’s agenda. 
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The Vision 
The recent result of all this has been a publicly articulated maritime vision for Indonesia that has 
commanded a great deal of interest within Indonesia and the wider Asia-Pacific region. It was most 
clearly enunciated in a number of key speeches abroad and at home by one of the candidates and his 
advisors in last year’s presidential election, and rather unexpectedly put into dramatic effect 
immediately after President Joko Widowo’s (popularly known as Jokowi) presidential victory. 
Broadly the Jokowi maritime vision, draws attention to the importance of the sea to Indonesia, 
makes investment in the country’s maritime and port infrastructure, its coastguard and navy a major 
priority, plans to overhaul the maritime administration and to assert control over Indonesian waters 
and foreign vessels which misuse them. It is a holistic, all-round and ambitious project. It directly 
confronts the issue of how, exactly, one ‘grows’ maritime power. But how to implement the vision? 
What are the problems, the prospects and the likely consequences - and what are the lessons for the 
rest of us? 
Implementing the Vision 
Looking at the problem theoretically, the task of becoming ‘a maritime power’ would appear to be 
fairly straightforward. It would seem to be largely a matter of reconciling ends, ways and means at a 
series of cascading decision-making levels ranging from the grand strategic at the top of the 
hierarchy to the tactical at the bottom. The devil, though, is in the practical details. It is these that 
make the task so difficult. For each country, the practical details are different, in consequence of 
their geography, political and strategic culture, economic state and general circumstances. But while 
their experience may be very different, there do appear to be a number of common factors that 
determine the relative success or failure of a country’s maritime development.    
In responding to these challenges, four broad tiers of decision-making are particularly important: 
 policy making at the level of grand strategy 
 grand strategy making 
 military policy and strategy making 
 naval policy and strategy making. 
Of course the distinctions between these four tiers are fuzzy, but their hierarchy represents a process 
of identifying national objectives at the top and implementing the naval means of securing them at 
the bottom. At every stage though, the relevant decision-makers have to reconcile ends (objectives), 
ways (methods) and means (tools and procedures). Major problems at any level can cascade down 
causing further difficulties lower in the hierarchy; inevitably, a feedback system can work its way 
up the hierarchy too. After all, a poor strategist does not take at least some account of his likely 
means when deciding his operational objectives and course of action.   
Tier 1: Deciding National Security Policy 
At the very top of the decision-making hierarchy, the task is to identify national objectives and to 
decide their relative importance and priority; and then to invest these objectives with the authority 
they need to command the necessary support and resources. This is a matter of policy, not strategy, 
making. This has to be done before those lower in the hierarchy can address the strategic issues of 
deciding how those objectives should be met. Moreover, Indonesia’s effort to articulate the vision, 
in order to provide guidance is notably ambitious in that it is maritime rather than merely naval. 
Many even inside Indonesia’s maritime community question the level of detail in the vision as so 
far enunciated by the Jokowi administration. For example, considerable investment money was 
promised for upgrading the country’s ports - but they ask, should this precede or follow the 
economic development of the specific islands? Should it be targeted at domestic inter-island 
4 
shipping or at luring in passing international shipping? Many such details remain unclear. 
Nonetheless, the overall maritime aspiration of the new administration is clear enough.  
What is much more questionable is whether the president, even one as popular as Jokowi has the 
necessary political authority to drive the project through. Political authority in Indonesia is divided 
vertically between the centre (Jakarta) and the islands and horizontally (between president and the 
legislature, and between the different agencies of government and between the agencies of 
government and the political parties and interest groups). In a situation where you can have the 
Jakarta Post reporting that the chief of police has simply refused to obey the president over a 
corruption-related issue, there are clear limits on the president’s capacity to drive his policy 
through.7 This is in strong contrast to the situation in China where an analogous aspiration to 
become a maritime power is being driven by a president, Xi Jinping, who is clearly the most 
powerful holder of the post since Mao and hence in a much stronger position to command 
outcomes. In comparison with China and indeed Australia, the labyrinthine nature of Indonesia’s 
bureaucracy and the sheer complexity of its institutional and constitutional arrangements makes 
strong leadership difficult. This has been evident in the country’s long struggle to establish an 
effective coastguard system.8  
The challenges facing decision-makers are clearly comprehensive in that they include all aspects of 
a country’s activity and interests - the political, social, economic, legal and military. For this reason, 
decision-making in national security policy likewise requires a comprehensive approach in which 
all aspects of a country’s interests are represented, prioritised and effectively integrated. One 
increasingly common way of doing this is the formation of some sort of national security council 
system that represents all stakeholders at this level. In his election campaign, Jokowi promised to 
set such a system up, and has indeed done so, but some have been disappointed by some of the 
people he appointed to it, and for that matter to his cabinet too. 
The military in general and the Army in particular are now much less important in national life and 
policy making than they used to be. In some ways, this is helpful since the Army’s priorities were 
naturally land-centric, but it reduces the voice of the Navy too. It is clear that now the Indonesian 
military do not have the direct access to the top enjoyed for example by the Chinese navy. This 
allows the Chinese navy both to help shape and to reflect leadership perceptions of the maritime 
requirement in a manner that their Indonesian and indeed Australian equivalents might envy.9 This 
is a time of great change but it is far from clear, moreover, that the necessary integration of the view 
points of all the relevant stakeholders at this level has as yet been accomplished. 
Two problems that affect prospects for maritime development often characterise this level of policy 
decision-making. The first is the problem of sea-blindness. Sea-blindness is a condition which leads 
sufferers either vastly to under-rate the relative importance of the maritime domain or which leads 
them to acknowledge this in theory but to delay or postpone measures to protect maritime interests 
to some later and unspecified date after more apparently urgent national requirements are met. For 
this reason, ‘maritime interests’ are not handed down for further urgent consideration lower in the 
policy and strategy making hierarchy. Despite its maritime setting, Indonesia has long suffered from 
this culturally. Many islanders turn their backs on the sea, seeing it more a source of vulnerability 
than of opportunity. This encourages sea-blindness. 
The Jokowi administration is seeking to combat this by constant speeches and exhibitions to 
articulate the vision and exhibitions and by romantic maritime glories of the Srivijaya and 
Majahapit empires.10 In his inaugural speech Jokowi promised, 
to do our utmost to regain Indonesia’s status as a maritime state. Oceans, seas, straits and 
peninsulas are the future of our civilisation. We have long been neglecting the sea, ocean, 
strait and peninsula. Now it is the time for us to regain all so that the motto of our 
predecessors Jalesveva Jayamahe, that in sea we will be glorious, will echo again.11  
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The same message is hammered home by dramatic political theatre - such as the very public sinking 
of foreign fishing boats, which undoubtedly goes down well with many Indonesians, if not their 
regional neighbours. 
Another common problem is that of having to ‘see through a glass darkly’. It is uniformly and 
intrinsically difficult for foreign ministries or treasuries to predict the future and to gauge its 
requirements. The extent of this problem is such that it may seem naively optimistic to expect much 
in the way of a guiding national policy in the first place. Wide consultation with non-military 
sources of expertise may help articulate policy alternatives and faster and more effective responses 
to unexpected developments. For that to happen, though, there needs to be an informed 
‘commentariat’ (derived essentially from the university sector and national think tanks) and a 
willingness for policy-makers to engage with them openly. In Indonesia articulation both before and 
after the election has made the topic of Indonesia as a maritime power for the first time a subject of 
national discourse.12 While it is growing and while the military do have their own internal think 
tanks, Indonesia’s informed and independent commentariat remains very small - certainly when 
compared to Australia’s. 
Without such internal and external debate, policy statements will tend to be bland enough to cope 
with the variety of consequences of their being unable to predict what is likely to happen and so 
advise what their country must do in defence of national interest - and when. Options are 
maintained rather than prioritised. There is talk of balanced approaches towards the future, which in 
practical terms offer very little real guidance to decision-makers lower down in the system. In 
Indonesia, critics of the 2008 defence white paper complained that it provided little real guidance 
for the Ministry of Defence to define the objectives on which it should base its acquisition 
planning.13 When this happens, those lower in the hierarchy either follow the same line and 
preserve options rather than determine priorities, or, more insidiously, they decide their own way 
forward in the light of decisions which they think the policy-makers above them should have made, 
but did not. Amongst the consequences of this are political, economic, or military decisions made 
largely for narrow sectional reasons. 
Finally, deficiencies in the national maritime defence industrial base limit the country’s maritime 
economic development, restrict governmental revenue, and act on a brake on naval aspirations. But 
attempting to deal with this problem may itself generate long term economic priorities that conflict 
with the Navy’s short term ones. Here, then, there are clashes of interest between different groups 
within the broader maritime community. Which should get the priority the civilian or the military 
domains? The Navy, the coastguard or the civilian port infrastructure - and which ports, where? 
And who can and should make the decisions? 
Tier 2: National Defence and Security Strategy Making 
This cabinet-level tier is largely a matter of identifying the ways and means by which policy 
objectives are to be achieved and of providing the necessary resources. Here general policy 
directions are translated into practical action across the whole front of government activity. In this, 
the maritime dimension takes its place alongside all the others in the consequent jostling for 
resources and budgetary priority. Here the issue is to identify the extent to which the various levers 
of national power can most effectively contribute to the general policy objectives identified earlier 
and to ensure that each ‘lever’ is provided with the resources necessary for the task.  
Since government resources anywhere are never the equal of possible commitments, this is likely to 
be an essentially competitive process and the political standing of the advocates of each dimension 
of policy is likely to be critical to their success. Here, the maritime interest’s capacity to get its case 
‘heard’ depends on the attitudes of the political class and their willingness to advance it.  
Indonesia benefits here at least in the sense that maritime development has been authorised at the 
highest level, and the objectives of a substantial government investment in the maritime industries, 
a greatly increased rate of foreign investment and increasing the defence budget from 0.9 per cent to 
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1.5 per cent have been clearly articulated. Whether these initiatives will succeed at the cabinet and 
legislature levels however remains to be seen.14 There were however, clear moves in the same 
direction even before Jokowi took over, which included making the ‘empowerment’ of the defence 
industry one of eight national priorities for the state budget, alongside such high priority areas as 
infrastructure investment.15 
To try to get the maritime community to work better together, Jokowi has set up a new 
Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, but it does just that, it coordinates. As yet it has neither 
the responsibility nor the budget to run maritime affairs. There would be tremendous bureaucratic 
resistance to significant moves in that direction. Nonetheless the maritime case is now being better 
heard and better financed than it was. 
Tier 3: Defence Policy Making at the Ministry Level 
At this third (Ministry) level, it is a question of implementing broader decisions taken higher up, 
within the constraints of the resources allocated. Each section of the maritime community, the 
industrial, the Navy and the coastguard, have to identify their policy ‘ends’ or objectives, deduce 
their strategy and decide their ‘ways’ and allocate their ‘means’. For the military this will ideally be 
articulated in some kind of defence white paper that establishes identified ends for those lower in 
the hierarchy to deliver by various ways and means. As also in Australia, this for Indonesia is an 
occasional rather than an annual event.16 From now on, this paper will concentrate on the navy as 
just one element of the maritime cause. 
The Indonesian navy already aspires to be a world-class one, and an implementing program for a 
‘minimum essential force’ to be achieved by 2024. This it hopes will allow it when working 
alongside the coastguard agencies to exercise the necessary jurisdiction over Indonesian waters, and 
where necessary represent Indonesian interests overseas.17 But it has had plans before which came 
to nothing or very little. So what is necessary to get them realised this time?  
Defence is beginning to benefit from the presidential intent to raise defence spending to 1.5 per cent 
of an increasingly impressive gross domestic product that grows 5-7 per cent every year. This is 
clearly to the good, but in Indonesia, there is as yet little evidence of that real ‘jointery’ in defence 
policy formulation, command arrangements, materiel acquisition and professional military 
education that best facilitates a maritime rather than merely naval approach to national defence. The 
differences between the Navy and the Air Force were exhibited by their differing claims and only 
partly coordinated response in the recent search for the missing Air Asia plane. 
Reforms have been urged and Jokowi has talked of the ‘empowerment of an integrated system of 
armed forces’ but what that will produce remains to be seen.18 There are however encouraging 
moves towards the establishment of three joint commands covering the whole of the archipelago 
and although the Army remains dominant, progress is being made.  
As anywhere else, a chief of navy cannot himself decide to buy a new amphibious ship, for 
example. Instead, he will have to pass this up through the Ministry of Defence for a decision at 
cabinet or presidential level. He will do his best to oil the wheels in public statements of need and 
shape the atmosphere through practical demonstration. The last navy chief publicly said that he 
could only afford enough fuel for about 50 patrol craft; if he had more, the implication was, he 
could catch and sink a lot more of the foreign boats stealing Indonesia’s fish. Such statements have 
an influence, of course. 
Tier 4: Naval Policy and Strategy Making 
The ways, ends and means approach applies just as much at the fourth level, the Navy department 
and its industrial and coastguard equivalents, where the maritime capabilities required to sustain the 
naval contribution towards the conduct of actual or potential military operations in support of 
national policy are developed. This requires the identification and prioritisation of naval roles and 
the development of the capabilities to perform them to the required degree. All of the potential 
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constraints noted above will apply here too, but there are additional complications that especially 
apply to naval development. 
First the maritime scene incorporates and represents industrial, shipping and fishing interests as well 
as the Navy and the coastguard. It will require the Navy to work alongside the coastguard and other 
agencies of safety and law enforcement at sea operations. In all probability, his will require close 
cooperation with other like-minded navies as well. This may well be quite separate from, and to 
some extent competitive with, its linkages to the other two services 
Second, to the extent that the procurement and acquisition of materiel is handled at the navy 
department level, then a series of non-military industrial considerations are likely to come into play. 
The acquisition of naval materiel is intrinsically difficult since both the lead times normally 
required to produce sophisticated naval weapons, sensors and platforms and their probable service 
life are likely to be very long. As a result, one recent study has called defence acquisition one of the 
most demanding forms of human activity.19 It necessarily results in a future-oriented procurement 
strategy that tends to suffer quite badly from the unpredictability of the future economic, budgetary 
and strategic environment. Typically, this will result in constant delays, cost increases and iterative 
tinkering with the original specification - and eventually in the failure or chronic delay of the 
program in ways which means that the navy tends to acquire new materiel in an piecemeal, 
opportunistic way rather than as part of an overall strategic plan and in a manner which may 
undermine its capacity to perform its present roles, let alone its future ones. The Indonesian navy 
has shown itself to be far from immune to such pressures and constraints. 
Nor can the problem of corruption be safely ignored. It means that procurement decisions can be 
made for entirely the wrong kind of reasons. Corruption penalises Western companies that play by 
the rules compared to Russian and Chinese ones that do not necessarily. It means that lower grade 
officers engaged in maritime security operations can be bribed by law-breakers. All this will clearly 
impede the realisation of Indonesia as a maritime power.  
Although the Navy is generally regarded as cleaner than most - and certainly much cleaner than the 
police, corruption is recognised as such a major problem in all walks of Indonesian life that the 
Corruption Eradication Commission [Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi] (KPK), has been set up to 
deal with it. Curbing corruption is one of the president’s main priorities. It is a complex issue, far 
from straight forward, that reflects cultural practice (the Javanese present-giving culture for 
example), comparatively low military pay and the requirement to secure agreement from other 
stakeholders. The KPK currently has no jurisdiction over the police or the military. Corruption is 
unlikely to be eradicated in the foreseeable future; at most it will be a reality to be better understood 
and managed. 
Additionally, there are problems in the industrial capacity of the country to produce the equipment 
the Navy needs in terms of time, number and quality. Indonesia’s critical defence industries such as 
PT Pinda and Surabaya-based PT PAL are underfunded, over-taxed and under-equipped. They are 
actively seeking new markets, both naval and commercial, not least because merely meeting 
government contracts earns them little if anything in the way of profit.20 Indonesia has the largest 
maritime defence industrial base in Southeast Asia but still more than 70 per cent of ship 
components are imported, with little indigenous contribution apart from the provision of labour. 
The country’s development of high-technology capabilities will be a major challenge, but there is 
nonetheless clear evidence of a government initiative to develop them, in both creation of a naval 
ship design centre and an offset policy intended to require foreign suppliers to return 85 per cent of 
the value of particular deals back to Indonesia through countertrade and offsets, of which 35 per 
cent must be directly in the defence sector.21  
Here there might well also be a conflict of interest between the Navy in getting what it needs when 
it needs it, and industry in developing the research, development and production sustainability that 
is so much easier to provide if demand is predictable and so can be planned for in advance. Finally 
if government policy is to develop a defence industrial sector not just for strategic reasons, but to 
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help encourage the kind of industrial and technological skills needed for a modern developed 
economy, then there might well be conflict between it and the immediate operational needs of the 
Navy. Almost certainly, for example, indigenously produced platforms will cost more than those 
bought ‘off-the-shelf’, so the Navy will typically get fewer of them for its money.22   
This is nowhere more evident than in the acquisition of submarines, important for smaller forces 
because of their sea denial capabilities. In 2012 Indonesia announced its attention to buy three 
Korean designed and constructed submarines but also its intent to build a force of between 6 and 12 
by 2024, along with a much enhanced industrial capability to develop as much production work as 
possible at home. This latter requirement is likely to cost more, increase developmental risk and 
impose delay. All of these problems of course find a distinct echo in Australia as in other countries. 
The balance of risk and of advantage in buying foreign as opposed to developing independent 
indigenous industrial capacity is one of the trickiest defence policy choices that governments face. 
This is all too obvious in the case of Australia’s Collins submarine class replacement program 
where buying from a known and tested foreign supplier might well yield significant financial 
savings and satisfy the navy’s immediate needs, but only at the cost of political support and 
prospects for developing the country’s long-term industrial economy. Additionally industrial 
cooperation with a suppliers such as Japan or Korea, or in other technical areas the United States 
has important strategic connotations as well which may, or may not, be a design requirement.23       
Coping with all these problems as well as delivering the kind of equipment and 
technical/managerial skill sets needed for the navy to be able to do what it needs to do requires 
enough ‘smart’ personnel to contribute to the naval policy and decision making system and indeed 
to influence policy at least at the Ministry level too. This demands heavy investment in professional 
military education and training, which it is beginning to get. All this may be particularly difficult for 
smaller navies like the Indonesian, which cannot generate the economies of scale in either platforms 
or personnel that make such problems more manageable.  
However, since 2012, there has been a clear effort to develop a coherent and sufficiently resourced 
minimum essential force designed first to focus on internal threats and then on external pressures.24 
This notion was forward by the new administration, which has repeated the intention to produce an 
effective ‘green-water’ fleet capable of providing security against piracy and smuggling for the 
country’s extensive local waters by 2024. Some estimate that the sheer size of these waters would 
require some 700 platforms - compared to the 150 or so it has now.25 Moreover, there seems to be 
an intent to support all this with improved infrastructure ashore. The aim of the minimum essential 
force is to acquire 274 ships divided between a striking force of 110 ships, a patrol force of 66 ships 
and a supporting force of 98 ships.  
As far as the Navy is concerned, this is the target. The extent to which this target is achieved in just 
under ten years’ time will reflect the overall success of Indonesia in its project to grow its maritime 
power. 
Conclusions and Lessons for Everyone 
This brief review of the challenges that Indonesia faces in this project shows that they are unique in 
many respects, thanks to Indonesia’s particular geographic, domestic and strategic circumstances 
but many of them analogous to other countries as well. A few very broad conclusions about the 
process of growing maritime power might be ventured:    
 Success will reflect not just what a country does, but the particular geographic and strategic 
circumstances that it finds itself in. Neighbours likewise developing their maritime power are 
likely to encourage the process elsewhere.  
 It suggests that growing, maintaining or re-invigorating maritime power does not, pace Admiral 
Herbert Richmond, come naturally even for countries where their geographic and economic 
circumstances look so maritime.  
9 
 Although the Indonesian maritime project is now inevitably associated with President Jokowi, it 
is not in fact new. Building up Indonesia as a maritime power has been a key national 
preoccupation since the time of President Suharto. In Indonesia as elsewhere this will be a long-
term project measured in decades rather than years and, sadly, perhaps of limited interest to 
politicians solely concerned with very short-term issues. There are no quick fixes. 
 Success requires a coherent vision capable of persuasively integrating the interests of the 
country’s major stakeholders, and one that is constantly articulated by word and deed. For all its 
ambiguities, there is no doubt that in Indonesia there is, for the moment, at least a sense of 
maritime vision. Australians may wonder what their equivalent of this is. It is one thing, also, to 
advocate naval expansion, quite another and much more difficult matter to advance maritime 
growth.  
 It needs not just high-level buy-in, but a ‘champion’ to represent at the highest level the urgency 
of the maritime interest in an environment always likely to be highly competitive, especially in 
times of budgetary constraint. While it is true that the diffusion of political authority in 
Indonesia means that President Jokowi is in a weaker position to advance the maritime cause 
than say, China’s President Xi, the existence of such a high-level champion is undoubtedly of 
huge advantage when compared to countries where the chief of navy is delegated the task - if 
only because in the immortal words of Mandy Rice-Davies: ‘He would say that, wouldn’t he?’ 
 Success may breed success (and the reverse?). Aspirations may change, and with success, 
expand. There seems to be a historic predisposition for navies naturally to expand their interests 
from the near to the far seas. In the long term it would be surprising if a country with the 
massive resources and potential of Indonesia did not follow this pattern. But this does draw 
attention not just to their resource base but also to the country’s institutional and socio-cultural 
ability to realise it 
In short, the eventual outcome of the Indonesian maritime project, is likely to be of considerable 
significance to Australia and the rest of the Indo-Pacific region not just for the new ports and 
platforms it delivers but also for the insights it provides into the complexities of growing maritime 
power.     
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